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Summary 
Since 1993, the Administration has negotiated and Congress has approved 13 free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with labor provisions, and is considering additional FTAs. Based on similarity 
of language, these FTAs can be sorted into four groups, or “models,” which have evolved to 
contain successively greater levels of enforceability. This report first identifies the enforceable 
labor provisions in each model. Second, it identifies two types of labor enforcement issues: (1) 
those that relate to the FTA provisions themselves, including their definitions and their 
enforceability, and (2) those that relate to executive branch responsibilities, such as resource 
availability and determining dispute settlement case priorities. This report does not address other 
labor issues in the various free trade agreements, including cooperative consultation and capacity-
building provisions. 
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Background 
The inclusion of enforceable labor provisions—that is, those subject to dispute resolution 
procedures—in various trade agreement authorities and related reciprocal trade agreements has 
evolved over time.1 At first, U.S. trade policy focused on lowering tariffs on goods. It was later 
extended to various types of nontariff barriers. 
Labor principles and standards are not subject to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and 
disciplines. The International Labor Organization (ILO), an arm of the United Nations founded in 
1919, is the multilateral organization with responsibility for labor issues. For nearly 90 years, the 
ILO has been working to create, through adoption at its annual International Labor Conferences 
of Member countries, Conventions, which set international standards. 
The ILO has adopted at least 183 Conventions, eight of which define four “core labor” principles. 
This occurred when first, a U.N. Social Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1995 declared that 
four categories of principles and rights at work are fundamental: (1) freedom of association and 
collective bargaining; (2) the elimination of forced labor; (3) the elimination of child labor; and 
(4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.2 The ILO then 
responded by pulling these together as the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work and its Follow-Up. The Declaration commits all ILO Member States, whether or 
not they have ratified the specific conventions, to respect the labor principles in these four key 
areas. The Follow-Up, among other things, calls for reports by developing countries that have not 
ratified one or more of the core Conventions, on the status of their implementation of the various 
rights.3 
The United States had unilaterally promoted the development of “internationally recognized 
worker rights,” principles similar to those in the ILO Declaration, through its trade preference 
laws for developing countries. These trade preference laws cover five main programs: the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 1975; the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 1983; the 
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 1991; the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
2000; and the Haiti Opportunity through Partnership Act (HOPE), 2006. These laws all require 
that as a condition of obtaining and maintaining program eligibility, beneficiary countries must 
take steps to afford their workers “internationally recognized worker rights.” These rights are 
listed in Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Section 507), as similar to ILO core labor principles 
listed above, except the U.S. list substitutes for the fourth principle listed above: “acceptable 
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health.”4  
In 1996, backed by the United States and other developed countries, the then-124-member WTO 
debated whether to form a committee to look into the relationship between trade and labor 
standards. Developing countries, in the majority, argued that the issue had no place in the WTO 
framework; was little more than a smokescreen for protectionism; and was a bid by industrial 
                                                 
1 Trade promotion authority refers to presidential authority to enter into trade agreements that Congress considers under 
expedited procedures (most recently in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210). For more information, see 
CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy.  
2 United Nations World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen. March 6-12. 1995. 
3 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up: About the Declaration. From the 
ILO website, at http://www.ilo.org. 
4 See Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618 as amended), Sec. 507 (4)(E). 
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nations to undermine the comparative advantage of lower-wage trading partners.5 Ultimately they 
prevailed. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration, reporting on what they decided, stated that the 
ILO (rather than the WTO) would be the “competent body to set and deal with ... internationally 
recognized core labor standards.”6 The ILO has no enforcement tools, but rather promotes labor 
standards through consensus, moral suasion, and technical assistance. 
Inclusion of labor provisions in bilateral U.S. trade agreements has evolved. The first two U.S. 
FTAs with Israel, 1985, and Canada, 1988, did not include labor provisions. This pattern began to 
change after 1993, when a number of factors came into play. First, the United States began to 
undertake FTA negotiations with lesser-developed countries. Second, it became increasingly 
accepted that labor issues were related to trade and trade policy. Third, consensus broadened that 
globalization had both costs and benefits. The benefits tend to be broadly dispersed and include 
relatively higher economic growth and productivity and greater access to lower-priced goods. The 
costs tend to be concentrated in import-competing sectors where there may be downward pressure 
on wages and job displacement. In developing countries, pressures to become a low-cost producer 
can lead to diminished working conditions and diminished worker rights. Fourth, business groups 
have increasingly been willing to make some concessions to labor groups in order to promote 
trade agreements and pave the way for greater trade with and investment in developing countries. 
Labor Enforcement in U.S. Free Trade Agreements 
Since 1993, the United States has negotiated 13 FTAs that include 19 countries.7 8 These are, 
chronologically, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada; 
bilateral agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman; a 
regional agreement known as CAFTA-DR, with the Dominican Republic and the five Central 
American Countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua); and 
bilateral FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The last four agreements reflect a 
bipartisan compromise on labor language as delineated in the “Bipartisan Trade Deal” (popularly 
known as the “May 10th Agreement,”) jointly agreed to between the leadership in Congress and 
the Administration on May 10, 2007. This agreement calls for, among other things, several 
additional labor provisions in FTAs including: (1) a fully enforceable commitment that FTA 
countries will adopt, maintain, and enforce in their laws and practice, the basic international labor 
standards as stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration; and (2) the use of identical enforcement 
provisions for labor and the other provisions in the agreements. Labor and enforcement 
provisions in these various trade agreements can be categorized into four different models. 
Model 1: NAFTA 
For NAFTA, labor provisions are included in the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC), a side agreement, rather than in the main agreement. Under NAALC, 
countries agree to enforce their own labor laws and standards. However, under NAALC, the only 
                                                 
5 World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted December 13, 1996, Sec. 4, Core Labour 
Standards. 
6 See WTO press brief on Trade and Labour Standards,  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/labstand.htm. 
7 The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in 1985, did not contain any labor provisions. 
8 For information on trade promotion authority under which these FTAs were negotiated and approved by Congress, 
see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. 
Fergusson. 
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provision enforceable with sanctions is a Party’s “persistent pattern of failure ... to effectively 
enforce its occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical standards,” 
where that failure is trade-related and covered by mutually recognized labor laws (Article 29). By 
comparison, all provisions relating to commercial operations are enforceable under the NAFTA. 
Furthermore, the labor side agreement has different enforcement procedures than does the main 
agreement, and places limits on monetary enforcement assessments, with suspension of benefits 
for noncompliance.  
Model 2: Jordan 
In the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, labor provisions and commercial provisions share the 
same dispute resolution procedures. Among labor provisions, each Party agrees to “not fail to 
effectively enforce its labor laws ... in a manner affecting trade” (Article 6.4). Under the Jordan 
agreement, labor laws are defined as U.S. internationally recognized worker rights. All labor 
provisions and commercial provisions are equally enforceable. If the dispute is not resolved under 
procedures specified, the affected Party shall be entitled to take “any appropriate and 
commensurate measure” (Article 17.2(b)). However, in an exchange of letters between the USTR 
Robert Zoellick and Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher before Congress considered the 
implementing legislation in 2001, the governments reportedly agreed to resolve any potential 
disputes without resorting to trade sanctions.9 
Model 3: Seven FTAs 
Seven trade agreements with 12 different countries (Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, 
Bahrain, Oman, and the six CAFTA-DR countries) include only one enforceable labor provision: 
each country “shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws ... in a manner affecting trade 
between the Parties.” The agreements define labor laws as “a Party’s statutes or regulations ... 
that are directly related to” the list of U.S. internationally recognized worker rights. All 
provisions in these agreements relating to commercial operations are enforceable. The seven trade 
agreements share many of the same procedures for labor and commercial disputes. Procedures for 
labor disputes place limits on monetary penalties, whereas those for commercial disputes do not. 
Suspension of benefits is a “last recourse” option for both types of disputes. 
Model 4: May 10th Agreement 
Four FTAs 
On May 10, 2007, the bipartisan leadership in Congress and the Administration agreed to a 
Bipartisan Trade Deal to include, among other things, provisions in pending FTAs: with Peru, 
Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. These are (1) a fully enforceable commitment that Parties 
to free trade agreements would adopt and maintain in their laws and practices the ILO 
Declaration; (2) a fully enforceable commitment prohibiting FTA countries from lowering their 
labor standards; (3) new limitations on “prosecutorial” and “enforcement” discretion (i.e., 
countries cannot defend failure to enforce laws related to the five basic core labor standards on 
the basis of resource limitations or decisions to prioritize other enforcement issues); and (4) the 
                                                 
9 Governments: “would not expect or intend to apply the Agreement’s dispute settlement enforcement procedures … in 
a manner that results in blocking trade.” Jordan Free Trade Agreement Approved by Finance and Ways and Means, 
Inside U.S. Trade, July 27, 2001. 
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same dispute settlement mechanisms or penalties available for other FTA obligations (such as 
commercial interests).10 
The four concepts were incorporated into all four agreements in virtually identical form. The 
language appears to limit item (1) in the May 10th Agreement, described above, by including two 
footnotes to the key provision: that each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes, regulations, 
and practices, the rights as stated in the ILO Declaration and its Follow-Up. The first footnote 
limits obligations of Parties to those specified in the ILO Declaration (i.e., without also including 
the Follow-Up). The second footnote requires that a party seeking to challenge violations must 
demonstrate that the failure to adopt or maintain ILO core labor principles has been “in a manner 
affecting either trade or investment between the two countries.”11 In Model 4 resolution of 
disputes may involve monetary assessments (with no dollar limits) and, if they are not paid, 
suspension of benefits until the non-conformity is eliminated. The most recent agreements were 
approved by Congress in the following implementing bills: with Peru, in 2007 (P.L. 110-138); 
with South Korea in 2011 (P.L. 112-41); with Panama in 2011 (P.L. 112-43); and with Colombia 
in 2012 (P.L. 112-42).  
Proposed TPP 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), whose text was released by President Obama on 
November 5, 2015, includes 11 countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean. Six are already covered 
by previous FTAs: Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore. The additional five are 
Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam. The TPP is based on the May 10 agreement, 
plus a few additional provisions designed to strengthen adherence to labor principles. Under these 
new provisions: (a) each country shall “adopt and maintain” statutes and regulations governing 
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational 
safety and health; (b) Each party shall discourage “through initiatives it considers appropriate” 
the importation of goods produced in whole or in part by forced labor, including forced child 
labor; (c) Each party shall “endeavor to encourage” businesses to “voluntarily adopt” corporate 
social responsibility initiatives on labor issues “endorsed or… supported” by that party; and (d) 
Parties may use “corporate labor dialogue” to resolve labor issues expeditiously, to help them 
mutually agree on a course of action. Such actions may include “action plans” with “specific and 
verifiable steps,” such as labor inspections, investigations, or compliance action with appropriate 
timeframes and independent outside verification. Previously, action plans were authorized only 
under dispute settlement procedures. This provision codifies an initiative to begin action plans 





                                                 
10 Text: Congress Administration Trade Deal, Inside U.S. Trade, May 11, 2007; and Trade Facts: Bipartisan Trade 
Deal. Office of the USTR. Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy, May 2007. 
11 Labor chapter of each of the four FTAs, footnote 2. 
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Enforcement Issues 
Based on the differences between labor and commercial FTA provisions articulated in the four 
models, policy issues can be divided into two categories: the differences in labor vs. commercial 
provisions themselves (issues 1-3 below); and the differences stemming from the agencies 
charged with that enforcement (issues 4 and 5 below). 
1. Only Some Labor Provisions Are Enforceable 
Under Models 2 and 4, all labor provisions in trade agreements are technically enforceable.12 In 
Models 1 and 3, only certain labor provisions in trade agreements are enforceable. All 
commercial provisions in trade agreements are fully enforceable under all models. Under 
NAFTA, covered by Model 1, the labor side agreement, NAALC, as mentioned, includes one 
enforceable provision: a country must enforce a few of its labor standards—those relating to child 
labor, minimum wages, and occupational safety and health. A country is not required to enforce 
its laws relating to the most basic core labor rights—the right to organize and bargain 
collectively—issues which account for the majority of the labor submissions filed under the 
NAALC.13 The FTAs covered by Model 3 also include only one enforceable labor provision, but it 
is broader in scope than that in the NAALC: countries must enforce all of their own laws relating 
to internationally recognized worker rights in a manner affecting trade between the Parties. 
2. Different Enforcement Procedures for and Caps on Penalties for 
Labor Provisions 
Model 1 has separate and dissimilar enforcement procedures for violation of labor as opposed to 
other provisions. Model 3 has relatively similar procedures for violations under both types of 
provisions. However, both Models 1 and 3 place caps on potential maximum monetary penalties 
for violation of labor provisions, but place no caps on penalties for violations of other provisions. 
Models 2 and 4 have a single set of enforcement procedures covering labor and other provisions 
and place no caps on penalties. However, as mentioned, under the Model 2, U.S.-Jordan FTA, the 
Parties agree to make every attempt to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through 
consultations and without application of the FTA’s dispute settlement procedures. 
3. Limits Placed on Scope of Definition of a Term in Labor 
Provisions 
Labor provisions in Model 4 agreements are “fully enforceable” through the same dispute 
resolution procedures available for other disputes. However, a footnote limits a key labor 
provision—that countries adopt and maintain in their laws and practices, the rights as stated in the 
ILO Declaration. The footnote limits the scope of the definition, as mentioned, by saying, “The 
                                                 
12 Under the two-page dispute settlement section in the U.S.-Jordan FTA, which includes much less detail in its 
procedures than do Model 4 FTAs, if the Joint Committee does not resolve the dispute within 30 days after the 
presentation of the panel report, the affected Party shall be entitled to take “any appropriate and commensurate 
measure.” However, the dispute settlement, begins with language specifying that “the Parties shall make every attempt 
to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution through consultations,” and, as mentioned earlier, this provision was 
reinforced by a mutual exchange of letters between the two countries before Congress considered the implementing 
legislation. 
13 U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Trade and Labor Affairs. 
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obligations set out in Article 17.2, as they relate to the ILO, refer only to the ILO Declaration.” 
This would suggest that trading Partners could be held to the principles of the Declaration, but 
not the details of the Conventions and not the Follow-Up procedures.14 Some observers have 
raised concerns that some of the details in some of the ILO core labor standard conventions 
conflict with some U.S. labor laws, particularly state laws.  
4. Differentials in Procedures for Considering Disputes on Labor 
vs. Other Provisions  
Differences in the way that commercial and labor disputes are considered by the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) and the Department of Labor (DOL) can be summarized as follows: The DOC 
receives complaints about compliance with trade agreements from the Market Access and 
Compliance Office’s Trade Compliance Center “hotline,” industry groups, trade associations, 
Congress, U.S. Foreign Commercial Service officers, the USTR National Trade Estimates 
Report, and other sources. It uses its many resources to conduct research on compliance cases.15 
The DOL does not have a comparable “hotline,” but does have procedures for receiving 
complaints about labor violations under a free trade agreement.16 The DOL also states (1) that its 
core mission is primarily to protect the needs of U.S. workers, rather than those of other 
countries, which is where complaints about labor conditions related to trade agreements typically 
arise; and (2) that its international responsibilities include ensuring compliance with labor 
provisions of trade agreements and trade preference programs. The DOL receives information on 
foreign labor conditions from a number of sources including trade unions, Congress, Department 
of State labor officers at U.S. embassies, and the State Department’s Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices. The DOL, like the DOC, may take action to resolve an issue at any stage prior 
to dispute resolution.17 Any case not so resolved, may be referred by the respective agency to the 
Office of the USTR. 
5. Priorities for Disputes to be Pursued by the USTR 
Labor submissions have been filed with the DOL alleging violations of the labor provisions of the 
FTAs involving a number of countries, including Guatemala, Bahrain, Honduras, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, and Peru. However, to date, none of these disputes has resulted in formal 
consultation between the USTR and a foreign government, potentially leading to dispute 
resolution. Two cases currently pending are: one involving Guatemala, on which negotiations are 
still proceeding short of formal consultation; and another involving Bahrain, on which the 
Department of Labor has recommended to the USTR that the United States launch formal 
consultations.18  
Should a case not be resolved short of dispute resolution, the USTR must decide which cases it 
will pursue based on priorities. The USTR is a small operation. Entering into the dispute 
                                                 
14 The United States has ratified only two of the eight ILO core labor principles, although most of their substance is 
covered by U.S. law. 
15 Phone conversation with Commerce Department officials February 15, 2008. 
16 Procedural guidelines for submitting complaints to the DOL, Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) under a 
labor chapter of a free trade agreement are located in the Federal Register, Vol. 7, p. 245. December. 21, 2006. 
17 Phone conversation with USTR officials, April 4, 2008. 
18 World Trade Online, U.S., Guatemala Takes Another Stab at Resolving CAFTA Labor Fight, December 22, 2011; 
and DOL Report Recommends Bahrain Consultations Over FTA Labor Violation, January 3, 2013. 
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resolution process is a lengthy, involved, expensive process in terms of both personnel and 
resources. The USTR typically chooses cases to pursue based on a number of factors. These may 
include cases that involve clear violations, could clarify particular issues and/or be cases the 
USTR believes it can win, based on evidence and facts. 
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